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Note
It Can Do More Than Protect Your Credit Score:
Regulating Social Media Pre-Employment
Screening with the Fair Credit Reporting Act
Nathan J. Ebnet∗
Landing that great new job just got a little bit harder. In
addition to written applications, lengthy interviews, and comprehensive criminal and credit checks, a growing number of
employers are factoring job candidates’ social media profiles in1
to their hiring decisions. Even in 2006, roughly thirty-five percent of employers eliminated job candidates based on infor2
mation discovered online. And although it should come as no
surprise that more obscene social media content, such as sexually explicit photos or racist remarks, could damage an individual’s job prospects, so too could a long-forgotten blog post or
3
a heated political discussion with a friend. After all, only a few
clicks separate a staggering amount of personal data—
4
conveniently preserved online—from a curious employer.
Despite the increasing popularity of social media preemployment screening, whether or not such a practice is legal
∗ J.D. Candidate 2013, University of Minnesota Law School; B.A. 2009,
Gustavus Adolphus College. The author would like to give special thanks to
Professor Stephen Befort for his invaluable assistance throughout the writing
process. Many thanks also to the hardworking editors and staff members of
the Minnesota Law Review. Above all, the author expresses gratitude to his
family and friends. Copyright © 2012 by Nathan J. Ebnet.
1. See Jennifer Preston, Social Media History Becomes a New Job Hurdle, N.Y. TIMES, July 21, 2011, at B1.
2. NBC Nightly News: Profile: College Students Using New Web Site
Could Have Their Personal Information Read by Prospective Employers (NBC
television broadcast May 13, 2006) (transcript available at 2006 WLNR
8296767).
3. See Ian Byrnside, Note, Six Clicks of Separation: The Legal Ramifications of Employers Using Social Networking Sites to Research Applicants, 10
VAND. J. ENT. & TECH. L. 445, 446 (2008) (contrasting information regarding a
user’s favorite band or movie to posts that feature a person’s sexual escapades
and substance abuse).
4. See id. at 455–56.
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5

or appropriate is a subject of disagreement. Many employers
applaud social media pre-employment screening because it allows them to gather as much information as possible about job
applicants, making it easier to predict the likely match between
6
the applicant and the job. On the other hand, some commentators argue that employers should be wary of using social media
7
to evaluate job candidates. Citing concerns over the trustworthiness and authenticity of information obtained from the In8
9
ternet, along with the potential for its abuse, privacy experts
10
encourage employers to look elsewhere for applicant data.
Sharp disagreement over the legality of social media preemployment screening persists because the accessibility of social media challenges the regulatory framework governing tra11
ditional pre-employment screening practices. For example, the
Fair Credit Reporting Act (FCRA), which contains notice and
consent requirements for a wide variety of background checks
that are particularly relevant to the social media preemployment screening context, only applies to those back12
ground checks conducted by third-party screening companies.
Since most employers obtain and view an applicant’s social me5. See id. at 458 (“Many employment attorneys believe there is nothing
illegal about employers using social networking sites to uncover additional information about applicants.”).
6. See id. (“[E]mployers believe they have the right to obtain as much information as possible about applicants and that using social networking sites
‘is fair game to find out who will be the ‘best fit’ for their organization.’” (quoting Hiring: Pitfalls of Checking Job Applicants’ Personal Web Pages, MANAGING ACCOUNTS PAYABLE, Oct. 2006, at 5)).
7. See, e.g., Rachel Slagle, Approach Social Media Sites with Caution in
the Pre-Employment Screening Process, INSPERITY (Oct. 5, 2011), http://www
.insperity.com/blog/article/approach-social-media-sites-with-caution-in-the-pre
-employment-screening-proces/.
8. See Byrnside, supra note 3, at 476 (“[E]mployers should remember
that an applicant’s online persona does not always provide an accurate, reliable, or complete picture of the person.”).
9. For a discussion of discrimination in the hiring process, see Stephen F.
Befort, Pre-Employment Screening and Investigation: Navigating Between a
Rock and a Hard Place, 14 HOFSTRA LAB. & EMP. L.J. 365, 381 (1997).
10. See Carolyn Elefant, Do Employers Using Facebook for Background
Checks Face Legal Risks?, LAW.COM LEGAL BLOG WATCH (Mar. 11, 2008, 3:45
PM), http://legalblogwatch.typepad.com/legal_blog_watch/2008/03/do-employers-us
.html (“I think it’s unlikely employers are going to learn a good deal of jobrelated information from a Facebook page they won’t learn in the context of a
well-run interview, so the potential benefit of doing this sort of search is outweighed by the potential risk.”).
11. See Byrnside, supra note 3, at 458–59.
12. Fair Credit Reporting Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 1681–1681t (2006).
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dia information from a work or personal computer without the
assistance of a third-party screening company, this type of informal research escapes the restrictions of the FCRA and many
13
other regulations designed to protect an applicant’s privacy.
However, just like so many other aspects of the Internet,
14
social media pre-employment screening is evolving. With ac15
quiescence from the federal government, several start-up
companies now offer to research job candidates’ online activities for employers. Boasting of a superior method of social media research, these start-up companies hope to persuade employers to abandon “in-house” social media screening in favor of
16
a formal third-party report. Consider Social Intelligence, a
17
company founded in 2010 in Santa Barbara, California. It
scours the Internet for everything job applicants may have said
or done online in the past seven years and then provides employers a specialized social media report detailing an appli18
cant’s online activity. When social media pre-employment
screening is performed by third parties like Social Intelligence,
19
it must be FCRA compliant. Yet employers remain free to
avoid the restrictions of the FCRA by simply conducting inhouse online research rather than contracting with third par20
ties. This problematic loophole highlights the need for further
analysis in this emerging area of the law.
This Note argues that FCRA compliant third-party social
media screening appropriately balances the privacy interests of
job applicants with the information appetite of employers. Part
I describes traditional applicant screening strategies, how they
are regulated, and the distinctive privacy interests threatened
by employers’ informal use of social media during the hiring
process. Part II analyzes the utility and application of existing
regulatory methods to social media background checks. Finally,
13. See Byrnside, supra note 3, at 459 (noting that social media has increased the amount of applicant information “that is readily available to and
easily accessible by employers”).
14. See Preston, supra note 1, at B1.
15. See Letter from Maneesha Mithal, Assoc. Dir., Div. of Privacy & Identity Prot., Bureau of Consumer Prot., Fed. Trade Comm’n, to Renee Jackson,
Esq., Nixon Peabody LLP (May 9, 2011), available at www.ftc.gov/os/
closings/110509social-intelligenceletter.pdf.
16. See Preston, supra note 1, at B1.
17. Id.
18. Id.
19. See Mithal, supra note 15, at 2.
20. See Byrnside, supra note 3, at 465.
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Part III contends that the FCRA is uniquely suited to address
the legal problems arising from social media use in the hiring
arena. Therefore, this Note recommends that all social media
screening should be formalized—by requiring employers to hire
third-party companies to perform social media research and
submit to the FCRA, employers will obtain reliable applicant
information and respect candidate privacy.
I. EMPLOYERS’ PRE-EMPLOYMENT SCREENING
PRACTICES: THEN AND NOW
21

In today’s hyper-competitive market, employers likely
have the luxury of choosing from many highly qualified appli22
cants for any particular job opening. Still, employers routinely
“screen in” applicants who possess desirable characteristics and
23
“screen out” applicants with negative traits. Ultimately, they
try to find applicants with qualities that will maximize work
24
productivity and minimize costs and liability.
To aid in this search, employers use an assortment of familiar pre-employment screening practices, including inter25
views and background checks. But due to the likelihood that
even seemingly benign screening activities will go too far, traditional pre-employment screening is subject to a variety of legal
restrictions that attempt to protect applicants from an overly
26
intrusive hiring experience. New technologies threaten this
27
regulatory landscape. Specifically, the advent of social media
offers employers convenient access to previously unobtainable
21. The national jobless rate for the United States during January 2012
was 8.3 percent. See Press Release, U.S. Dep’t of Labor, The Employment Situation—January 2012 (Feb. 3, 2012), available at http://www.bls.gov/news
.release/archives/empsit_02032012.pdf.
22. See Catherine Rampell, Many with New College Degree Find the Job
Market Humbling, N.Y. TIMES, May 19, 2011, at A1 (stating that about only
half of the jobs landed by new college graduates require a college degree).
23. See Ann Marie Ryan & Marja Lasek, Negligent Hiring and Defamation: Areas of Liability Related to Pre-Employment Inquiries, 44 PERSONNEL
PSYCHOL. 293, 304 (1991).
24. Byrnside, supra note 3, at 448; see also JOSEPH ZEIDNER & CECIL D.
JOHNSON, THE ECONOMIC BENEFITS OF PREDICTING JOB PERFORMANCE, VOL.
I: SELECTION UTILITY 143 (1991) (positing that pre-employment “[t]esting can
save [employers] money because employees selected by valid tests are more
productive than those selected by other methods”).
25. See Byrnside, supra note 3, at 448.
26. See id. at 379–80.
27. See id. at 370–71 (suggesting that technological advances are likely to
continue to provide employers with new and sophisticated screening
technology).
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28

applicant information. Employers are implementing this powerful new hiring tool, justifying an examination of social media
pre-employment screening.
A. THE LEGAL CONSTRAINTS ON TRADITIONAL PREEMPLOYMENT SCREENING
Historically, employers relied on written applications,
questionnaires, interviews, references and background checks
29
to screen job applicants. These practices were presumed permissible, limited only by certain exceptions designed to pre30
serve the privacy of job candidates. If an employer appropriately balanced the prospective employee’s right to privacy with
the employer’s own right to hire a qualified individual, the pre31
employment screen was reasonable. However, within recent
years, even traditional pre-employment screening practices
32
have received heightened judicial and legislative scrutiny. In
particular, traditional pre-employment research is subject to
the anti-discrimination constraints of Title VII of the Civil
Rights Act of 1964 (Title VII) and the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA), state statutes regarding arrest records, the reporting restrictions of the FCRA, and the privacy protections
33
contained in the Fourth Amendment.
1. Title VII and the ADA
Title VII, the main federal anti-discrimination statute, forbids employers from discriminating against applicants based on
34
race, color, religion, sex, or national origin. Critically, Title
VII does not prohibit application procedures that elicit information concerning a protected class as long as employment decisions are grounded in legitimate, non-discriminatory mo28. See Byrnside, supra note 3, at 446–47 (“[P]rospective employers are
becoming increasingly aware of [social networking] sites and are taking advantage of the massive amount of newly available information to assist them
in them in their hiring decisions.”).
29. See generally Rochelle B. Ecker, Comment, To Catch a Thief: The Private Employer’s Guide to Getting and Keeping an Honest Employee, 63 UMKC
L. REV. 251, 255–61 (1994) (describing traditional methods of pre-employment
screening).
30. LEX K. LARSON, EMPLOYMENT SCREENING § 9.01 (1992).
31. Ecker, supra note 29, at 254–55.
32. See Befort, supra note 9, at 366.
33. See id. at 381.
34. See Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e–
2000e-17 (2006).
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35

tives. Guidelines promulgated by the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC) state that interview questions
that either directly or indirectly require the disclosure of information concerning protected class status may constitute evi36
dence of discrimination.
Similarly, the ADA prohibits discriminatory hiring against
individuals with a disability who, with or without reasonable
accommodation, can perform the essential functions of the em37
ployment position. But the ADA goes a step further than Title
VII: it actually prohibits employers from inquiring about the
existence, nature, or severity of a disability even if the respons38
es are not used in making an employment decision. As a general rule, employers may investigate an applicant’s abilities but
39
may not seek information concerning impairment status.
It is important to note that state statutes frequently sup40
plement Title VII and the ADA. In Minnesota, for example,
state law prohibits pre-employment inquiries concerning race,
religion, color, national origin, ancestry, sex, age, creed, marital
status, disability, status with regard to public assistance, and
41
sexual orientation. And so long as state laws provide equivalent or greater protection against discrimination, they are not
42
preempted by federal law. Yet the fairness guidelines imposed
by Title VII, the ADA, and relevant state statutes are primarily
limited to interview questions, questionnaires, and reference
43
checks. This has led state legislatures to create additional
rules to constrain other pre-employment screening practices.
2. State Statutes Regulating Applicants’ Arrest Records
In addition to self-reported information obtained through
interviews, questionnaires, and references, employers often
35. See Befort, supra note 9, at 381 (citing Bruno v. City of Crown Point,
950 F.2d 355, 363–65 (7th Cir. 1991)).
36. See id. at 382 (citing EEOC, Guide to Pre-Employment Inquiries, 8A
Fair Empl. Prac. Man. (BNA) 443:65–66 (1992)). Although EEOC guidelines
do not have the force of law, courts generally give them considerable deference. See Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424, 433–34 (1997).
37. Americans with Disabilities Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 12111–12117 (2006).
38. See Befort, supra note 9, at 383.
39. Id.
40. See, e.g., CAL. GOV’T CODE § 12940 (West 2011); MINN. STAT. § 363A
(2011); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 10:5-4 (West 2011).
41. MINN. STAT. § 363A.08, subd. 4(a)(1) (2011).
42. Befort, supra note 9, at 386.
43. See id. at 381–86.
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conduct background checks to gather information on an appli44
cant’s criminal record. Criminal background checks are usually permissible if employment decisions based on an applicant’s
criminal record are consistent with a business necessity and do
45
not have a disparate impact on a certain class of applicants. A
number of states have also restricted or prohibited the use of
arrest records, but not conviction records, in criminal back46
ground checks. Because arrests do not necessarily establish
guilt, these state statutes aim to avoid disparate impact problems while preventing the penalization of persons not subse47
quently charged with a crime for which they were arrested.
But since Title VII and the ADA provide the theoretical support
48
for state restrictions on arrest records in the hiring context,
states have been reluctant to expand restrictions on preemployment screening beyond criminal background checks.
However, some states restrict employers’ ability to look at other
49
types of public records.
3. The FCRA and Credit Scores
Many employers also screen applicants by examining cred50
it reports compiled by consumer credit reporting agencies. Using statistical formulas that reflect an individual’s bill-paying
history, including late collection actions, consumer credit re-

44. See id. at 404–06.
45. See id. at 404–05.
46. See, e.g., CAL. LAB. CODE § 432.7 (West 2011); 775 ILL. COMP. STAT.
5/2-103 (2011); MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 37.2205a (West 2011); N.H. REV.
STAT. ANN. § 21-I:51 (2011); WASH. REV. CODE § 10.97.050 (2011); WIS. STAT.
§ 111.335 (2011). See generally Daniel J. Solove, Access and Aggregation: Public Records, Privacy and the Constitution, 86 MINN. L. REV. 1137, 1169 (2002)
(“Confronted with increased information trade, some states have attempted to
restrict access to personal information in public records as well as certain uses
of personal information obtained from public records.”).
47. See Ecker, supra note 29, at 255–56.
48. Cf. Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424, 430–31 (1971) (holding
that otherwise neutral selection devices that have a disparate impact on protected classes may violate Title VII).
49. See Solove, supra note 46, at 1169–70.
50. See Ecker, supra note 29, at 257. A survey released by the Society for
Human Resource Management reveals that forty-seven percent of employers
admit to using credit checks for certain job applicants. Background Checking:
Conducting Credit Checks, SOC’Y FOR HUMAN RES. MGMT. (Jan. 22, 2010),
http://www.shrm.org/Research/SurveyFindings/Articles/Pages/BackgroundChe
cking.aspx.
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51

porting agencies generate a credit score. Next, these thirdparty reporting companies sell the relevant credit reports to interested employers who demonstrate a legitimate business
52
need for the information. Employers may view an applicant’s
credit score as a proxy for trustworthiness, since higher credit
scores are associated with creditworthiness and an ability to
53
meet one’s obligations.
Thus, to avoid liability during the credit reporting process,
both the employer and the third-party consumer credit reporting agency must comply with the FCRA. In 1970, Congress
passed the FCRA to “require that consumer reporting agencies
adopt reasonable procedures for meeting the needs of commerce
for consumer credit, personnel, insurance, and other information in a manner which is fair and equitable to the consumer, with regard to the confidentiality, accuracy, relevancy, and
54
proper utilization of such information . . . .” The FCRA gives
the Federal Trade Commission (FTC) the primary administra55
tive authority to enforce the provision of the FCRA. According
to the FTC, the FCRA is “intended to ensure that this country’s
consumer reporting system would function fairly, accurately,
and efficiently, without needless intrusion into consumer priva56
cy.” Courts generally agree that the purpose of the FCRA is to
ensure accuracy in reports affecting an individual’s eligibility
57
for credit, insurance, or employment.
The FCRA makes clear that applicants must give permis58
sion to an employer before a credit report is initiated, and that
notice must be given to applicants if an adverse decision results
51. See Building a Better Credit Report, FED. TRADE COMM’N, 3 (Aug.
2011), http://www.ftc.gov/bcp/edu/pubs/consumer/credit/cre03.pdf.
52. See id. at 1.
53. See id. at 3 (“[A credit score] helps predict . . . how likely it is that [a
person] will repay a loan and make the payments on time.”).
54. H.R. REP. No. 91-1587, at 16 (1970).
55. See Amanda L. Fuchs, Comment, The Absurdity of the FTC’s Interpretation of the Fair Credit Reporting Act’s Application to Workplace Investigations: Why Courts Should Look Instead to the Legislative History, 96 NW. U. L.
REV. 339, 341 (2001).
56. Fair Credit Reporting Act: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Consumer
Affairs and Coinage of the Comm. on Banking, Fin. and Urban Affairs, 102d
Cong. 20 (1991) (statement of David Medine, Associate Director for Credit
Practices, Federal Trade Commission).
57. See, e.g., D’Angelo v. Wilmington Med. Ctr., 515 F. Supp. 1250, 1253
(D. Del. 1981); Porter v. Talbot Perkins Children’s Servs., 355 F. Supp. 174,
176 (S.D.N.Y. 1973) (citing 116 CONG. REC. 36,572 (1970)).
58. 15 U.S.C. § 1681b(b) (2006).
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59

from the credit report. Moreover, the consumer reporting
agency, following a consumer’s request, must disclose the in60
formation that it maintains in the consumer’s file. Violators of
the FCRA can be sued for actual damages and, in some cases,
61
punitive damages.
Importantly, the FCRA only applies to “consumer re62
port[s]” prepared by “consumer reporting agenc[ies].” “Consumer report” is defined as:
[A]ny written, oral, or other communication of any information by a
consumer reporting agency bearing on a consumer’s . . . character,
general reputation, personal characteristics, or mode of living which
is used or expected to be used or collected in whole or in part for the
purpose of serving as a factor in establishing the consumer’s eligibil63
ity for . . . employment purposes.

The FCRA defines a “consumer reporting agency” as any
individual or business that “regularly engages in whole or in
part in the practice of assembling or evaluating consumer credit information or other information on consumers for the pur64
pose of furnishing consumer reports to third parties . . . .”
Based on these broad statutory definitions, the FCRA applies to
more than simply credit reports; other types of background
65
checks are subject to the FCRA. However, the statutory language noticeably fails to include informal research, performed
without third-party assistance, from FCRA regulation.
4. The Fourth Amendment
A final constraint, specifically on government employers’
pre-employment screening practices, is found in the Fourth
Amendment. Many job applicants worry that pre-employment
background checks—whether criminal, credit, or otherwise—
are an invasion of privacy in violation of the Fourth Amend66
ment. Consequently, privacy in the workplace, including the

59. See 15 U.S.C. § 1681m (2006); Ecker, supra note 29, at 258.
60. 15 U.S.C. § 1681g(a) (2006).
61. 15 U.S.C. §§ 1681n–1681o (2006).
62. Id.
63. 15 U.S.C. § 1681a(d)(1) (2006).
64. 15 U.S.C. § 1681(f ) (2006).
65. See Byrnside, supra note 3, at 465.
66. U.S. CONST. amend. IV (“The right of the people to be secure in their
persons, houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated.”).
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off-duty activity of job applicants, is garnering increased legal
67
attention.
Historically, Fourth Amendment violations were tied to
68
property invasions by law enforcement. But modern courts
have expanded Fourth Amendment rights to protect reasonable
69
expectations of privacy, following Katz v. United States. Accordingly, job applicants frequently argue that pre-employment
70
screening is an invasion of privacy. Yet much of the information gathered by employers through traditional preemployment screening tools is publically available, and the
Fourth Amendment only applies to certain kinds of governmental intrusions, which severely limits the Fourth Amendment’s
71
application to pre-employment screening. Nevertheless, the
Fourth Amendment legitimizes an expectation of privacy in
72
some circumstances.
Title VII, the ADA, state statutes, the FCRA, and the
Fourth Amendment provide a legal framework for traditional
pre-employment screening practices. However, this regulatory
structure is being challenged by social media, a tool that makes
it easier and cheaper for employers to acquire applicant infor73
mation. Even though the use of social media as an infor74
mation-gathering technique is increasing, this new hiring
practice has not met universal praise. In fact, distrust of social
media in the hiring arena is abundant, evidenced by numerous
67. See, e.g., Stephen D. Sugarman, “Lifestyle” Discrimination in Employment, 24 BERKELEY J. EMP. & LAB. L. 377, 378, 407 (2003) (discussing the
privacy impact of different methods of pre-employment research).
68. See, e.g., In re Pac. R.R. Comm’n, 32 F. 241 (C.C.N.D. Cal. 1887) (recognizing a citizen’s fundamental right to security from government inspection
of physical items such as private books and papers).
69. 389 U.S. 347, 360–62 (1967) (Harlan, J., concurring) (finding that the
government violated the Fourth Amendment by conducting warrantless
eavesdropping with an electronic listening device, because the defendant justifiably relied upon the privacy of a public telephone booth).
70. See Ecker, supra note 29, at 274.
71. See Katz, 389 U.S. at 350; Byrnside, supra note 3, at 452 (“Applicants
. . . often seek the ability to control their off-duty conduct regardless of a reasonable expectation of privacy.”).
72. Compare United States v. Mankani, 738 F.2d 538, 542 (2d Cir. 1984)
(holding that the use of a beeper to track an individual’s vehicular movements
was not a search in violation of the Fourth Amendment), with Kyllo v. United
States, 533 U.S. 27, 34 (2001) (deciding that the use of a thermal imager to
detect the heat emanating from the defendant’s home violated the Fourth
Amendment).
73. See Byrnside, supra note 3, at 453.
74. See id.
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news articles expressing outrage over social media’s new role in
75
pre-employment screening. Before detailing social media’s
unique impact on pre-employment screening, it is necessary to
review the history and characteristics of social media.
B. THE EMERGENCE OF SOCIAL MEDIA
Social media websites have exploded in popularity within
76
the last several years, amassing millions of dedicated users.
Joining a social media community is easy. On Facebook, for example, a user, armed with an e-mail address, a full name, and
a birth date, is quickly able to access an online community that
77
grows larger by the day. If Facebook were a country, it would
be the third largest in the world, landing behind China and In78
dia but ahead of the United States. Facebook provides a template into which a user, once registered, can enter virtually limitless information: relationship status, schools attended,
79
favorite movies, e-mail addresses, home addresses, and more.
Members may also post photos online with a “tag” that identifies the people in the photo by name and adds the photo to
80
those users’ personal profiles.
The breadth of personal information uploaded to social
media websites raises concerns over who can see what information and when. While Facebook allows members to restrict
the availability of the information posted online, the content is
81
less private than many users believe. Facebook’s default privacy settings are at a level intended to maximize visibility of
user profiles and to increase privacy the user must sort through
75. See, e.g., Alan Finder, For Some, Online Persona Undermines a Résumé, N.Y. TIMES, June 11, 2006, at 1; Ken Rodriguez, Want a Job After Graduation? Don’t Reveal Your Wild Side Online, SAN ANTONIO EXPRESS-NEWS, July
5, 2006, at 3A.
76. See, e.g., Samantha L. Millier, Note, The Facebook Frontier: Responding to the Changing Face of Privacy on the Internet, 97 KY. L.J. 541, 544
(2008).
77. As of July 21, 2010, 500 million users were registered on Facebook.
Mark Zuckerberg, 500 Million Stories, THE FACEBOOK BLOG (July 21, 2010,
9:23 AM), http://blog.facebook.com/blog.php?post=409753352130.
78. See Brian Solis, Facebook Connects 500 Million People: Defines a New
Era of Digital Society, BRIANSOLIS.COM (July 22, 2010), http://www.briansolis
.com/2010/07/facebook-connects-500-million-people-defining-a-new-era-of
-digital-society/.
79. Millier, supra note 76, at 544.
80. John Cassidy, Me Media: How Hanging Out on the Internet Became
Big Business, NEW YORKER, May 15, 2006, at 50.
81. See Byrnside, supra note 3, at 460–61.
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somewhat complicated (not to mention constantly changing)
83
option menus. Privacy advocates are especially wary of Face84
book and other social media platforms. By making online content permanent and widespread, social media creates digital
85
baggage that can be hard to escape. Furthermore, third parties are free to post private and misleading information or im86
ages online without the user’s consent. In sum, Facebook users in particular, and social media users in general, have a
false sense of security regarding the privacy of their social me87
dia profiles.
The FTC is beginning to respond to these mounting concerns. For example, Facebook and the FTC have recently finalized a settlement over deceptive practices related to privacy
88
settings. The settlement requires Facebook to agree to privacy
audits for twenty years and will prohibit Facebook from making public a piece of information that a user had originally
89
shared privately on the site. Nonetheless, the actual impact of
the deal is unclear. Jeff Chester, the executive director of the
Center for Digital Democracy, warns that the FTC’s Facebook
deal may only amount to “a tiny digital bump on the road that
does nothing to derail [Facebook’s] voracious appetite to swal90
low up our data.”
Employers have taken note of social media and its potential value as a hiring tool for precisely the same reasons that
82. See, e.g., The Evolution of Facebook Privacy, YALE J.L. & TECH. (Apr.
21, 2011), http://www.yalelawtech.org/control-privacy-technology/evolution-offacebook-privacy/.
83. See Byrnside, supra note 3, at 461.
84. See generally Danielle Keats Citron, Cyber Civil Rights, 89 B.U. L.
REV. 61, 62 (2009) (arguing that social networking sites are breeding grounds
for civil rights abuses).
85. See DANIEL J. SOLOVE, THE FUTURE OF REPUTATION: GOSSIP, RUMOR,
AND PRIVACY ON THE INTERNET 10–11 (2007) (advocating for a new system of
privacy on the Internet in order to address the challenges of digital rumors,
gossip, and shaming).
86. See Millier, supra note 76, at 545.
87. Ira Nathenson, Facebook: Job-Hunting, Non-Invisibility, and the
Creepiness Factor, NATHENSON’S DIGITAL GARBAGE (June 12, 2006),
http://digitalgarbage.net/2006/06/12/facebook/; see also Tim Armstrong, Social
Darknets, INFO/LAW (June 12, 2006), http://blogs.law.harvard.edu/infolaw/
2006/06/12/social-Darknets/ (describing the mismatch between perceived privacy and the actual level of privacy enjoyed by social media users).
88. See Claire Cain Miller, F.T.C. Said to Be Near Facebook Privacy Deal,
N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 11, 2011, at B3.
89. See id.
90. Id.
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applicants and the FTC raise privacy concerns about its use;
social media makes large amounts of previously unobtainable
91
personal data readily accessible. Indeed, social media “create[s] huge new portals for the mass disclosure of private in92
formation.” Thus, because of its novelty and informality, the
use of social media in pre-employment screening escapes many
of the regulations imposed on more traditional research techniques.
C. SOCIAL MEDIA AS A PRE-EMPLOYMENT SCREENING TOOL
Companies are rapidly adding social media preemployment screening to their hiring playbooks. Tech giant
Microsoft admits that “researching students through social
93
networking sites [is] now fairly typical.” Likewise, according
to a study conducted by CareerBuilder.com, about twelve percent of hiring managers screen job candidates by searching pro94
files on social networking sites. The actual number of employers screening applicants over the Internet is probably higher,
and sometimes large companies may not even be aware that
those involved with hiring decisions are researching applicants
95
online and factoring online information into their evaluations.
Even some professional associations are using social media during background investigations. The Florida Bar Association
Board of Bar Examiners visits Facebook and MySpace to investigate the “good moral character and fitness” status of bar ap96
plicants.

91. See Byrnside, supra note 3, at 455.
92. Andrew J. McClurg, Kiss and Tell: Protecting Intimate Relationship
Privacy Through Implied Contracts of Confidentiality, 74 U. CIN. L. REV. 887,
890 n.16 (2006).
93. Byrnside, supra note 3, at 456 (alteration in original) (citing Alan
Finder, When a Risque Online Persona Undermines a Chance for a Job, N.Y.
TIMES, June 11, 2006, at 1).
94. See One-in-Four Hiring Managers Have Used Internet Search Engines
to Screen Job Candidates; One-in-Ten Have Used Social Networking Sites, CareerBuilder.com Survey Finds, CAREERBUILDER.COM (Oct. 26, 2006), http://
www.careerbuilder.com/share/aboutus/pressreleases.aspx (follow “2006” hyperlink; then follow “10/26/2006” hyperlink).
95. See Michelle Sherman, Legal Issues Surrounding Social Media Background Checks, FCPA COMPLIANCE & ETHICS BLOG (Nov. 17, 2011, 1:13 AM),
http://tfoxlaw.wordpress.com/2011/11/17/.
96. See Jan Pudlow, On Facebook? FBBE May Be Planning a Visit, THE
FLA. BAR NEWS (Sept. 1, 2009), http://www.floridabar.org/DIVCOM/JN/
jnnews01.nsf/8c9f13012b96736985256aa900624829/d288355844fc8c728525761
900652232?OpenDocument.
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Unlike credit reports or criminal history background
checks, employers usually research an applicant’s social media
profile without seeking the assistance of a third-party reporting
97
company. Employers run quick social media searches from a
company or personal computer in hopes of finding informative
98
online content. But since September 2010, some employers
across the nation are contracting with third-parties, like Social
Intelligence, to institute formalized social media background
99
checks. The effect of this new development is significant:
third-party reporting agencies must comply with the FCRA
100
when performing social media research. However, it is clear
that many employers—if not most—continue to conduct infor101
mal social media screens.
As a consequence of social media’s popularity and accessibility, one might think that most job applicants would choose to
remove, or not post, provocative online information that could
102
reach an employer. Numerous stories indicate otherwise. For
example, one eager job applicant failed to receive an offer after
103
being linked to an online advertisement seeking OxyContin.
Similarly, after discovering that an applicant’s Facebook profile
included interests such as “‘smokin’ blunts’ . . . shooting people
and obsessive sex,” one employer removed an otherwise quali104
fied applicant from consideration. Even if such online behavior is in jest and taken out of context, employers are unlikely to
105
hire an individual who demonstrates poor judgment online.
Although job applicants themselves are frequently to
blame for the harmful online material that influences an employer’s hiring decision, the accuracy, authenticity and rele106
vance of online content is suspect, particularly because photo
97. See Byrnside, supra note 3, at 457 (positing that the majority of employers do not use formal means to research an applicant’s online behavior).
98. See Melissa Bell, More Employers Using Firms that Check Applicants’
Social Media History, WASH. POST, July 15, 2011, at C1 (discussing generally
the ease with which employers can find details of applicants online).
99. See id.
100. See Mithal, supra note 15, at 1.
101. See Bell, supra note 98.
102. See Millier, supra note 76, at 542–43 (discussing the problem by which
“the desire to share information with one’s friends may also expose users to
unknown third parties who may misuse their information”).
103. Preston, supra note 1, at B1.
104. Finder, supra note 75, at 1.
105. See Byrnside, supra note 3, at 473–74.
106. See id. at 470–71.
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editing tools and hacking problems are ubiquitous. In light of
these concerns, together with the uniqueness and usefulness of
social media from an employer’s perspective, the question
arises: is there a legal framework that can adequately regulate
social media pre-employment screening?
II. THE UTILITY OF EXISTING REGULATORY SCHEMES
AS APPLIED TO IN-HOUSE SOCIAL MEDIA PREEMPLOYEMENT SCREENING
The unique features of social media pre-employment
screening make its use cumbersome to regulate under existing
108
laws.
Unlike its predecessors, most social media preemployment screening is performed in-house without third109
party assistance.
Furthermore, social media screening is
quick, convenient and anonymous. As a result, many employment attorneys conclude that there is nothing illegal about em110
ployers using social networking sites to research applicants.
And since a case has yet to arise that suggests otherwise, the
potential liability risks to employers who use social media to
111
screen applicants appear to be low. Simply put, Title VII, the
ADA, state statutes, the Fourth Amendment, and the FCRA do
not adequately impose restrictions, or the threat of liability, on
employers who informally screen job applicants with social media. These deficiencies, however, do not warrant wholesale
abandonment of the regulatory principles that control traditional pre-employment screening practices. In particular, the
Fourth Amendment and the FCRA promote useful notions of
limited online privacy and notice that should be applied to social media pre-employment research.
A. THE SHORTCOMINGS OF TITLE VII AND THE ADA
An employer that refuses to hire an applicant due to the
candidate’s protected class status may violate the anti107. See Ian Lovett & Adam Nagourney, Arrest Is Made in Hacking of Celebrities’ Private E-Mail, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 12, 2011, at A20 (reporting that all
computer users are vulnerable to hacker attack).
108. See Corey M. Dennis, Legal Implications of Employee Social Media
Use, 93 MASS. L. REV. 380, 381–92 (2011) (discussing the risk of liability from
invasion of privacy and discrimination claims).
109. See Byrnside, supra note 3, at 457.
110. Hiring: Pitfalls of Checking Job Applicants’ Personal Web Pages,
MANAGING ACCOUNTS PAYABLE, Oct. 2006, at 4, 5.
111. See Dennis, supra note 108, at 381 (acknowledging that the primary
liability risk is from employment discrimination lawsuits).
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discrimination principles of Title VII and the ADA. As indicated above, Title VII and the ADA forbid discrimination based on
an applicant’s race, color, religion, sex, national origin, or disa112
bility. Social media profiles regularly display such sensitive
information, in addition to other intimate details of users’ pri113
vate lives. The availability of this information online does not
necessarily lead to discrimination—only adverse employment
decisions based on an applicant’s social media profile could result in discrimination claims—but social media does provide
employers a chance to access information they would otherwise
not be privy to and certainly would be unable to ask about dur114
ing a job interview.
If an employer used social media to ascertain applicants’
membership in a protected class and subsequently used that
information to systematically remove certain applicants from
employment consideration, the employer would risk liability for
115
discrimination. Assuming a claimant could provide documentation of the discriminatory practice, Title VII and the ADA
would proscribe that sort of social media pre-employment
116
screening.
Other discriminatory use of social media preemployment screening could also implicate Title VII and the
ADA—for example, if an employer only viewed the social media
profiles of certain types of applicants, or if it viewed some social
117
media content with a discriminatory lens.
But Title VII and the ADA only go so far. The type of personal or misleading information collected by social media preemployment screening is usually unrelated to race, religion,
118
sex, disability, or any other protected class. Employers turn
to social media in an effort to learn all manners of personal information, “including drinking habits, nudity, general sleaziness, and criminal behavior ranging from shoplifting to violent

112. See supra discussion at Part I.A.1.
113. See Byrnside, supra note 3, at 462–63 (noting that users’ sexual orientation, political affiliation, age, and marital status are commonly viewable on
social media profiles).
114. See id.
115. See Ed Frauenheim, Caution Advised When Using Social Networking
Web Sites for Recruiting, Background Checking, WORKFORCE MGMT. ONLINE
(Nov. 2006), http://www.workforce.com/section/06/feature/24/58/49/245851.html.
116. See Byrnside, supra note 3, at 463–64 (using the example of an employer who only looks at the profiles of African Americans and women).
117. See id.
118. See Dennis, supra note 108, at 381.
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assaults.” It is exactly this kind of personal information that
applicants argue should be excluded from pre-employment re120
search. Applicants want the freedom to express themselves
online without fear that employers may find this information
121
and then use it to make hiring decisions. Applicants further
contend that an employer’s hiring decision should come down to
who is best qualified for the job, not the applicant whose life122
style choices resonate with, or least offend, an employer.
While anti-discrimination statutes play an important role in
ensuring that social media sites are not used as an unfair hiring tool, Title VII and the ADA do not address the biggest problems of social media screening—authenticity, accuracy, and
123
relevance. Under both Title VII and the ADA, it appears to be
perfectly legal for an employer to methodically exclude applicants with drunken or provocative photos on their social media
124
pages.
B. STATE STATUTES REGULATING BACKGROUND CHECKS ARE
LIMITED IN APPLICATION
Adding to the protections of Title VII and the ADA, most
states have enacted statutes that restrict or prohibit employers’
125
inquires about an applicant’s arrest record. State legislatures
were worried that even though an arrest is not an indication of
guilt, employers would unfairly disqualify those applicants
126
with arrest records. On its face, social media screening shares
many of the negative aspects inherent in employers’ use of arrest records, as online content may be highly prejudicial and

119. LaJean Humphries, The Impact of Social Networking Tools and
Guidelines to Use Them, LLRX.COM (Jan. 15, 2007), http://www.llrx.com/
features/goodgoogle.htm.
120. Cf. Finder, supra note 75, at 3 (discussing students’ views that the
“adult world” does not know about social media sites such as Facebook).
121. See Byrnside, supra note 3, at 472.
122. See Dennis, supra note 108, at 382 (arguing that reference checks, interviews and more traditional background screening will satisfy most employers’ need to hire the best candidate).
123. See, e.g., id. (“[O]n social networking sites and blogs, destructive
groups have published lies and doctored photographs of vulnerable individuals, sent damaging statements about victims to employers, and manipulated
search engines to highlight those statements for business associates and clients to see.”).
124. See Byrnside, supra note 3, at 465.
125. See supra discussion at Part I.A.2.
126. See Ecker, supra note 29, at 255.
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entirely unrelated to an applicant’s ability to perform job du127
ties.
Regardless of the similarities, state statutes pertaining to
arrest records are not an appropriate foundation for regulating
social media pre-employment screening. First, these state statutes are situation specific and do not provide a broad privacy or
accuracy principle that can be applied to other forms of back128
ground research. Even assuming that social media are the
kinds of public records that states occasionally regulate, state
129
statutes only limit access in predefined areas. Indeed, the
130
majority of public records are unrestricted.
Additionally, expanding state regulations to include social
media pre-employment screening ignores the advantages of a
national policy. A strong national policy regarding social media
background checks is preferable over widely differing state
public record regimes because a national policy would create a
131
minimum level of privacy protection. A uniform privacy baseline increases the likelihood that applicants would know about
their privacy rights, and likewise, that users of restricted information would know the responsibilities that accompany
132
their access to such information. Therefore, a federal baseline
must be established; states would be free to adopt stricter protections of privacy, but a federal program “must provide a
133
meaningful floor of protection.” While admirable in purpose,
state statutes restricting employers’ use of arrest records are
not fully responsive to social media screening.
C. THE FOURTH AMENDMENT PROVIDES HELPFUL PRINCIPLES,
BUT CASE LAW PREVENTS ITS APPLICATION TO SOCIAL MEDIA
PRE-EMPLOYMENT SCREENING
Despite its frequent invocation, a Fourth Amendment invasion of privacy claim corresponding to employers’ use of social media to screen applicants is unlikely to succeed. As a
threshold matter: “[T]he Fourth Amendment cannot be trans127. See Dennis, supra note 108, at 381–82.
128. See Solove, supra note 46, 1169–70.
129. See id. (discussing context-dependent state statutes that restrict access to motor vehicle, accident, traffic citations, voter, and arrest records).
130. See id.
131. Cf. id. at 1200 (preferring a national over a state regulatory system for
public records as technological advances increase the digitization of public
documents).
132. See id.
133. Id.
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lated into a general constitutional ‘right to privacy.’ That
Amendment protects individual privacy against certain kinds
134
of governmental intrusion . . . .” It follows that the Fourth
Amendment cannot adequately regulate social media preemployment screening since a substantial portion of employers—private employers—would elude its protections.
Further limiting an applicant’s Fourth Amendment claim
arising from social media pre-employment screening is the rule
that a claimant must have a reasonable expectation of privacy
135
in order to bring suit. Critically, courts often consider infor136
mation available online to be in the public domain, and “the
137
rule of thumb is: If it’s in the public domain, it’s fair game.”
In other words, existing precedent indicates that a person who
willingly posts personal information to a social media site lacks
a reasonable expectation of privacy regarding that infor138
mation. In rare circumstances, however, an applicant might
be able to assert a credible invasion of privacy claim against a
government employer. For example, an applicant may have a
strong invasion of privacy claim if the employer hacks past the
privacy settings on an applicant’s social media page, or if a
139
third party unlawfully posted private information online. But
even stringent privacy settings do not guarantee a successful
invasion of privacy claim following a breach. It would be “tough
to prove that this expectation of limited access, even if reasona140
ble, is an expectation of ‘privacy.’”

134. Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 350 (1967) (emphasis added).
135. See supra discussion at Part I.A.4.
136. See Michael Whiteman, The Impact of the Internet and Other Electronic Sources on an Attorney’s Duty of Competence Under the Rules of Professional
Conduct, 11 ALB. L.J. SCI. & TECH. 89, 97 (2000) (discussing the availability of
new legal developments that can be found online in considering whether to
reprimand attorneys for professional conduct violations).
137. Martha Irvine, Privacy Becomes Concern as Social Media Online Sites
Become Fair Game, USA TODAY (Dec. 30, 2006), http://www.usatoday.com/
tech/news/2006-12-30-privacy-online_x.htm.
138. See generally John. S. Ganz, Comment, It’s Already Public: Why Federal Officers Should Not Need Warrants to Use GPS Vehicle Tracking Devices,
95 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 1325, 1333–34 (2005) (finding existing precedent to be critical of invasion of privacy claims that are based on publicly observable and voluntarily exposed information).
139. See George Lenard, Employers Using Facebook for Background Checking, Part I, GEORGE’S EMP’T BLAWG (Dec. 6, 2006), http://www
.employmentblawg.com/2006/employers-using-facebook-for-backgroundchecking-part-i/.
140. Id.
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While the Fourth Amendment’s direct extension to social
media pre-employment screening is untenable, recent Fourth
Amendment jurisprudence does provide a useful framework for
thinking about privacy on the Internet. In the landmark decision United States v. Maynard, the court applied a “mosaic theory” to rule that prolonged and warrantless GPS vehicular surveillance amounted to a search in violation of the Fourth
141
Amendment. The court recognized a reasonable expectation
of privacy regarding the totality of one’s movements on public
142
streets, even though isolated outings are publicly exposed.
For the court, a reasonable person expects that each public
143
movement will remain “disconnected and anonymous.” Since
Maynard, the mosaic theory has received praise in some circles
for elegantly accommodating an expectation of privacy in some
144
public activity.
Building on the Maynard precedent, several scholars suggest that personal information, while public to an extent when
posted on the Internet, demands some level of privacy protection. According to Professor Daniel J. Solove:
Privacy involves an expectation of a certain degree of accessibility of
information . . . . [P]rivacy entails control over and limitations on certain uses of information, even if the information is not concealed. Privacy can be violated by altering levels of accessibility, by taking obscure facts and making them widely accessible . . . .
We know that our lives will remain private not in the sense that
the information will be completely shielded from public access, but in
the sense that for the most part, it will be lost in a sea of information
about millions of people. Our personal information remains private
because it is a needle in a haystack, and usually nobody will take the
145
time to try to find it.

However, the fact remains that only a few courts, in limited situations, have been willing to abandon the public versus
141. United States v. Maynard, 615 F.3d 544, 562 (D.C. Cir. 2010), aff’d in
part sub nom. United States v. Jones, 132 S. Ct. 945 (2012). Since the U.S.
Supreme Court affirmed the Maynard decision on slightly different grounds,
the lasting impact of the mosaic theory remains to be seen.
142. Id.
143. Id. at 563 (quoting Nader v. Gen. Motors Corp., 25 N.Y.2d 560, 572
(1970) (Breitel, J., concurring)).
144. See, e.g., Bethany L. Dickman, Note, Untying Knotts: The Application
of Mosaic Theory to GPS Surveillance in United States v. Maynard, 60 AM. U.
L. REV. 731, 738 (2011).
145. Solove, supra note 46, at 1178. Contra Romano v. Steelcase Inc., 907
N.Y.S.2d 650, 657 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 2010) (“[W]hen Plaintiff created her Facebook
and MySpace accounts, she consented to the fact that her personal information would be shared with others.”).
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private dichotomy that defeats a reasonable expectation of pri146
vacy if the contested information is disclosed publicly. Still,
the novel efforts by some courts to include seemingly public information under the Fourth Amendment legitimize the regulation of social media pre-employment screening. Sure, social
media sites are in the public domain, but their use—especially
by employers—should not be without limits.
D. THE FCRA: A WORKABLE BUT INSUFFICIENT BASIS FOR
REGULATING SOCIAL MEDIA’S PROMINENCE IN HIRING
DECISIONS
As argued above, social media pre-employment screening
should be regulated not with the goal of preventing it, but rather to control accessibility and ensure authenticity, accuracy,
147
and relevance. To that end, the FCRA contains the procedural requirements necessary to regulate social media preemployment screening in a manner that responds to the privacy values expressed in recent Fourth Amendment jurisprudence. Under the FCRA, an employer must (1) receive an applicant’s permission before a background check is conducted and
(2) notify the applicant if an adverse employment decision is
148
based on the background check. Applying these requirements
to social media pre-employment screening sufficiently protects
applicants’ privacy interests without unduly harming employers’ “best fit” concerns.
First, by requiring prior approval, the FCRA ensures that
applicants will not be surprised when an employer views social
media content. Relatedly, prior approval gives the applicant an
opportunity to clean up potentially misleading information,
146. See Solove, supra note 46, at 1181–82. Compare Y.G. v. Jewish Hosp.
of St. Louis, 795 S.W.2d 488, 502 (Mo. Ct. App. 1990) (holding that plaintiffs
did not waive their right to keep their participation in a medical program private by attending a party for those involved in the program), and Sanders v.
Am. Broad. Co., 978 P.2d 67, 72 (Cal. 1999) (recognizing a reasonable expectation of privacy in workplace discussions with coworkers even though others
could overhear the conversations), with Nader v. Gen. Motors Corp., 255
N.E.2d 765, 770 (N.Y. 1970) (ruling that personal information already disclosed to others could hardly be considered private despite the fact that it had
been shared with select persons only), and Fisher v. Ohio Dep’t of Rehab. &
Corr., 578 N.E.2d 901, 902 (Ohio Misc. 2d 1988) (determining that a plaintiff
who told four coworkers that some interactions between herself and her young
son had “sexual overtones” could claim no reasonable expectation of privacy as
to her statements).
147. See supra discussion at Part II.C.
148. See supra text accompanying notes 50–53.
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prepare explanations regarding suspicious material or increase
privacy settings on particular content. If “claims that employers are invading applicants’ privacy by looking at their social
149
networking profiles [are] the most common,” then giving an
applicant notice rewards the attentive applicant and dissociates social media pre-employment screening from a form of
online spying.
Second, by requiring notice for adverse decisions based on
a social media pre-employment screen, the FCRA affords an
applicant another opportunity to correct or remove damaging
online content. It may be easy to blame an applicant for sexually explicit photos posted on the Internet, but as more people
post content online and do so at a much younger age, a disparaging comment or activity could be essentially forgotten until
uncovered by the employer. As noted by attorney Ian Byrnside,
“[w]here youthful indiscretions were once easily forgotten with
the passage of time, today’s youth and their indiscretions ‘can
150
be preserved in perpetuity’ for all to see.” Furthermore, this
disclosure would create a formalized record of the online content, a potentially useful tool in Title VII or ADA litigation.
Compared to other regulatory options, it is unlikely that
employers would be unduly burdened by FCRA-regulated social
media pre-employment research. Instead of completely banning
social media from playing a role in hiring decisions, the FCRA
would allow employers to access pertinent online content as it
151
relates to future job performance. The FCRA gives employers
a choice: conduct social media research the right way—in a way
that actually maximizes legally permissible applicant data—or
not at all. Undoubtedly, contracting with a third party to conduct social media screens would be more expensive and would
require more planning than in-house research, but it is possible
that the efficiency gains due to a condensed and relevant thirdparty report would more than make up for the employer’s mon152
etary investment. Employers could also prioritize which vacant positions were important enough to require social media
149. Byrnside, supra note 3, at 461.
150. Id. at 476 (quoting Your Resume May Be Overshadowed by Your
Online Persona, PRIVACY RTS. CLEARINGHOUSE (July 9, 2006), http://web
.archive.org/web/20110708005601/https://www.privacyrights.org/print/ar/Onli
nePersona.htm).
151. See 15 U.S.C. §§ 1681–1681t (2006).
152. For Social Intelligence’s list of the advantages of third-party reporting,
see SOCIAL INTELLIGENCE, http://www.socialintel.com (last visited Oct. 18,
2012).
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screening. And if all employers used third-party reports, a
market would be created in which third-party reporting agencies would compete with each other for business, resulting in
153
better services at lower prices.
Unfortunately, the FCRA’s significant merits do not
change the fact that much of social media pre-employment
screening is conducted by the employer, not a third-party
screening company. No complex statistical formulas or detailed
comparison factors are needed to understand an applicant’s so154
cial media page. Unless Facebook and similar social media
websites revert back to a college-only admissions policy, an incredibly unlikely occurrence considering the success of expand155
ed membership programs,
employers are not forced to go
through third-party organizations to obtain social media content. And since the FCRA only impacts background research
conducted by a third-party “consumer reporting agency,” in156
house research need not be FCRA compliant. Thus, the employer does not have a legal duty to obtain permission prior to
an investigation, provide notice of negative online information,
157
or investigate potential errors and correct misinformation.
However, the missing link capable of placing social media
pre-employment screening under the FCRA umbrella is now a
reality. Third-party social media screening and the corresponding FCRA compliance, provided by companies like Social Intelligence, is on the rise. That is a good thing for applicants. Still,
employer participation in third-party screening is lacking, illustrating the need for FCRA tweaking.

153. See Hon. Richard D. Cudahy & Alan Devlin, Anticompetitive Effect, 95
MINN. L. REV. 59, 101–02 (2010) (“[P]erfect competition yields allocative and
productive efficiency in the long run, while monopoly results in deadweight
loss and wealth transfers.”).
154. See Building a Better Credit Report, supra note 51, at 3.
155. See Press Release, Facebook, Facebook Expands to Include Work
Networks (May 3, 2006), available at http://newsroom.fb.com/News/FacebookExpands-to-Include-Work-Networks-d9.aspx.
156. 15 U.S.C. § 1681(f ) (2006).
157. Your Resume May Be Overshadowed by Your Online Persona, PRIVACY
RTS.
CLEARINGHOUSE
(July
9,
2006),
http://web.archive.org/web/
20110708005601/https://www.privacyrights.org/print/ar/OnlinePersona.htm.
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III. THE FCRA AND THIRD-PARTY REPORTING: A FAIR
WAY TO REGULATE SOCIAL MEDIA BACKGROUND
CHECKS
Until very recently, social media pre-employment screening occurred in-house instead of through a third-party report158
ing agency. Although employers regularly turned to thirdparty reporting agencies for criminal background checks or
credit reports, the accessibility of social media encouraged employers to perform their own Internet research. To address the
privacy implications of in-house social media research, previous
scholarship advocated a “grandmother rule,” where social media users would only post online content they would be com159
fortable sharing with their grandmas. Likewise, employers
were encouraged to forgive online youthful transgressions, or
alternatively, merely avoid violating the restrictions of Title
VII, the ADA, state statutes, and the Fourth Amendment when
160
using social media. Until a judicial or legislative decision was
made regarding employers’ use of social media in the hiring
process, these solutions largely relied on the goodwill of employers to protect applicant data, a steep request considering
the ease of online research.
But now, employers have the option to hire third parties to
conduct social media pre-employment research. Since the FTC
mandated that third-party social media screens must comply
with the FCRA, all of the privacy and notice advantages of
FCRA regulated pre-employment research (like credit reports)
can be applied to the social media context. Nonetheless, simply
the option to use third-party social media screening is not
enough to protect applicant privacy or to ensure that employers
will enjoy the advantages of third-party screening. If social media is to be considered during pre-employment evaluation, employers must be required to use third parties. Therefore, the
FCRA should be amended to expressly prohibit in-house social
media research. Like with other violations of the FCRA, a successful claimant should be permitted to recover damages from
an employer who conducts in-house social media screens.

158. See Byrnside, supra note 3, at 465–66.
159. See, e.g., id. at 474.
160. See, e.g., id. at 474–76.
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A. THIRD-PARTY SOCIAL MEDIA REPORTS WOULD PROTECT
APPLICANT PRIVACY
As explained above, the FCRA has the potential to nicely
regulate social media pre-employment screening by restricting,
161
rather than prohibiting, Internet research. FCRA-compliant
social media screening puts the applicant on notice, giving him
or her ample time to increase privacy settings, remove misleading information, or prepare explanations for suspicious online
162
content. Furthermore, it eliminates the guesswork from social media screening. No longer will applicants be forced to
wonder whether it was their qualifications or spring break picture that removed them from job consideration. Any impact
that social media pre-employment screening has on an employment decision must be reported to the applicant. This
transparency decreases the likelihood of Title VII or ADA viola163
tions and allows an applicant to take remedial measures.
At the same time, third-party social media reporting does
not substantially harm employers. Personal information on the
Internet is abundant, but as spokeswoman for the Society for
Human Resource Management Jen Jorgensen correctly recognizes, “[j]ust because the information’s out there doesn’t mean
164
it’s useful.” Third-party reporting agencies can present employers with applicant information that is job-related and those
agencies can remove sensitive information that could lead to
165
disparate impact claims. Additionally, because the FCRA imposes a duty to report accurate information, the likelihood that
false or misleading social media content influences an employ166
er’s decision-making process will be reduced. Familiarity with
social media should allow third-party reporting agencies to better detect when particular content is the result of high-tech
sabotage.
For some employers, however, even the benefits of more reliable social media data may pale in comparison to the costs of
third-party social media reporting. Given that there are currently few legal risks associated with in-house social media

161. See discussion supra Part II.D.
162. See supra notes 128–30 and accompanying text.
163. See Byrnside, supra note 3, at 469–70.
164. Id. at 470 (citing H.J. Cummins, Bosses Peek in on Web Site for Students, SEATTLE POST-INTELLIGENCER, Apr. 3, 2006, at D1).
165. See id.
166. See id. at 471.
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167

screening, employers may be reluctant to give up in-house research for third-party social media screening. Yet these complaints fail to recognize that regulating social media preemployment research with the FCRA would not require em168
ployers to hire third-party reporting agencies.
Employers
would be free to forego social media research if the expense of
third-party reporting were too great. And all of the traditional
pre-employment screening tools—interviews, reference checks,
criminal history reports—would still be available at little ex169
pense to the employer. The substantial privacy interests implicated by in-house social media research outweigh the costs
incurred by employers if they choose to pursue third-party social media pre-employment screening.
In addition to the benefits of FCRA compliant third-party
social media research from an applicant’s perspective—and its
minor impact on employers—third-party social media screening
is also consistent with the purpose of the FCRA. Congress enacted the FCRA to prevent “needless intrusion into consumer
privacy” and to “ensure that this country’s consumer reporting
170
system would function . . . accurately.” Third-party reporting
balances those legislative interests—it filters out irrelevant applicant information, it notifies the candidate of an employer’s
intention to conduct research over the Internet, and it provides
the employer with accurate data. Social media’s prominent role
in hiring decisions was surely beyond the anticipation of Congress when the FCRA was first passed, but third-party social
media screening is consistent with the fairness guidelines of
the FCRA. Finally, it is important to note that the broad language and purpose of the FCRA provides a malleable legal
standard that is able to keep pace with technological advancements. After all, future pre-employment screening practices
will likely involve the Internet, but whether Facebook and
Twitter will still be useful is anyone’s guess.
Privacy commentators are beginning to take note of the
advantages of third-party social media pre-employment screening. To test the third-party reporting process, Mat Honan, a
167. See supra note 110 and accompanying text.
168. See supra discussion at Part II.D.
169. Cf. Befort, supra note 9, at 415–16 (noting that several traditional preemployment screening techniques are not overly expensive).
170. Fair Credit Reporting Act: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Consumer
Affairs and Coinage of the Comm. on Banking, Fin. and Urban Affairs, 102d
Cong. 20 (1991) (statement of David Medine, Associate Director for Credit
Practices, Fed. Trade Comm’n).
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writer for the tech blog Gizmodo, along with five other Gizmodo
employees, underwent a social media screen conducted by So171
cial Intelligence. The five others passed, but Mr. Honan’s
screen was more troublesome; online information revealed his
172
previous proclivity for cocaine and LSD. Despite the results,
Mr. Honan concluded that “these kind of [third-party reporting]
services actually make a lot of sense. . . . [I]t’s better for both
the employer and the candidate to have a disinterested third173
party do full-scrape background checks.” Plus, the procedure
174
may not be as invasive as one might think. Anything that
could be considered discriminatory or irrelevant in a job search
175
was removed from Social Intelligence’s final report.
Nevertheless, third-party social media screening elicits
176
comparisons to Big Brother. A fear that mostly innocent Internet activity, including “bawdy jokes” or “slightly irreverent”
177
photos, will unfairly prevent qualified applicants from securing jobs drives much of the opposition to third-party social media reporting. Privacy-focused senators Al Franken and Richard Blumenthal recently wrote Social Intelligence to voice their
concerns about “numerous scenarios under which a job applicant could be unfairly harmed by the information [Social Intel178
ligence] . . . provides to an employer.” While well-intentioned,
these criticisms miss the point. Employers, with or without disinterested third-party assistance, will research job applicants
online. But by turning to companies like Social Intelligence,
employers actually agree to submit to the fairness and accuracy
requirements of the FCRA. As Mr. Honan points out, “[a]s an
171. See Mat Honan, I Flunked My Social Media Background Check. Will
You?, GIZMODO (July 7, 2011, 2:13 PM), http://gizmodo.com/5818774/this-is-asocial-media-background-check.
172. See id.
173. Id.
174. Bell, supra note 98.
175. See Honan, supra note 171.
176. See, e.g., “Social Intelligence” Receives FTC Approval to Archive Facebook Posts for Job Screening Purposes, FACECROOKS (June 22, 2011, 8:15 AM),
http://facecrooks.com/Internet-Safety-Privacy/&E2%80%9CSocial-Intelligence
%E2%80%9D-receives-FTC-approval-to-archive-Facebook-posts-for-JobScreening-Purposes.html.
177. Id.
178. Letter from Sen. Al Franken & Sen. Richard Blumenthal, to Max
Drucker, Chief Exec. Officer, Social Intelligence Corp. (Sept. 19, 2011), available at http://www.norwalkplus.com/nwk/information/nwsnwk/publish/News_1/
Blumenthal-Franken-quiz-Social-Intelligence-Corp-on-practices_np_14566
.shtml.

2012]

REGULATING SOCIAL MEDIA SCREENING

333

employee, you don’t want potential employers knowing certain
things about you that might make you a less attractive candidate due to their personal biases. As an employer, even if none
of those things matter, just accidentally finding them out can
179
be a problem.” Third-party social media reporting allows a
neutral entity to determine what online content is appropriate
during hiring considerations.
Questions regarding the privacy benefits of third-party social media pre-employment screening endure, perhaps because
of the discomfort that typically attaches to new hiring practic180
es. Amidst this contentious environment, the FTC approved
Social Intelligence’s reporting practices as consistent with the
181
FCRA. After determining that Social Intelligence was indeed
a consumer reporting agency under the FCRA, the FTC
dropped its investigation into Social Intelligence’s practices and
thereby tacitly endorsed Social Intelligence’s screening meth182
ods. As long as the FTC continues to monitor the activities of
Social Intelligence and other third-party screening companies,
their implicit approval of third-party reporting is reasonable
and actually respects applicant privacy.
The FTC’s approval of Social Intelligence should increase
183
employers’ comfort with third-party social media reporting.
However, in order for the real benefits of third-party social media screening to be realized, more than just a handful of employers must seek the assistance of outside vendors.
B. SUGGESTIONS FOR MANDATING THIRD-PARTY SOCIAL MEDIA
REPORTS
For the FCRA to have any force, employers that desire applicants’ social media information must be required to hire
third-parties to conduct their social media pre-employment
screening. While the benefits of third-party social media reporting may incentivize some employers to forego in-house Internet
184
research, the additional expense may be enough to dissuade
179. See Honan, supra note 171.
180. See Kashmir Hill, Senators Worried Job Seekers ‘Unfairly Harmed’ by
Social Media Background Checks, FORBES.COM (Sept. 20, 2011, 3:31 PM),
http://www.forbes.com/sites/kashmirhill/2011/09/20/senators-worried-jobseekers-unfairly-harmed-by-social-media-background-checks/.
181. See Mithal, supra note 15, at 2.
182. See id.
183. See Sherman, supra note 95.
184. See discussion supra Part II.D.

334

MINNESOTA LAW REVIEW

[97:306

many others. Therefore, the FCRA should be expanded to prohibit in-house social media research, federal agencies should
strictly enforce third-party social media reporting, and employers should implement policies that prohibit internal screening.
Perhaps the best place to add a restriction on social media
research would be in § 1681b of the FCRA since it deals with
the permissible purpose of consumer reports. Following the discussion of the conditions for furnishing and using consumer re185
ports for employment purposes, clear language—mirroring
the existing style of the FCRA—should be inserted that states:
“Due to the increasing amount of personal data present on the
Internet, there is a need to protect the consumer’s right to privacy regarding such information. Subject to the requirements
of this title, employers seeking information regarding a consumer’s Internet presence, including, but not limited to, a consumer’s social media activities, shall exclusively rely on consumer reporting agencies to supply such information.” Obvious
interpretation challenges would arise because of the terms “Internet presence” and “social media activities.” Confusion could
be mitigated by FTC guidance, however, and modifications to
this proposed statutory amendment would be more than welcome. Political pressures, expert testimony, and enforcement
feasibility would likely impact the language of the final
amendment. What is important, though, is that employers are
clearly prohibited from conducting in-house social media research, and held liable for noncompliance under § 1681n of the
FCRA.
To add teeth to this proposed amendment, appropriate federal agencies must support properly conducted third-party social media reporting. By dropping its investigation of Social Intelligence, the FTC legitimized third-party social media
186
screening. More is needed. The FTC must not only regulate
third-party reporting agencies, but it must also ensure that
employers are discontinuing their reliance on informal social
media searches. To do so, in accordance with its regulatory au187
thority, the FTC should regularly investigate employers that
perform in-house social media research. When appropriate, the
existence of an investigation should be identified in a press release. Additionally, the FTC should create and enforce harsh

185. See 15 U.S.C. § 1681b (2006).
186. See supra text accompanying notes 153–55.
187. See 15 U.S.C. § 45 (2006).
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penalties for businesses that continue to informally mine social
188
media for applicant data.
The EEOC should partner with the FTC to address the
problem of employers avoiding FCRA compliance by conducting
informal social media research. Through its outreach, education, and technical assistance programs, the EEOC should
highlight the benefits of third-party Internet screening. This
support should not equal blind endorsement. Rather, the EEOC
and FTC should recognize that third-party reporting that is
compliant with the FCRA is the better alternative to in-house
social media research.
Employers should take an active role too. Adopting an internal policy that prohibits in-house social media screening is a
critical first step toward mandating third-party social media
reporting. By incorporating a social media policy into an ethics
and compliance program, employers can ensure that current
employees involved in hiring decisions do not give in to the
189
temptation to conduct informal Internet research. And because employees cannot “un-see” content posted to social media
pages—perhaps giving irrelevant information relevance during
a hiring decision—employers should firmly prohibit in-house
social media research.
Admittedly, informal use of social media is difficult to completely separate from hiring decisions. Even the staunchest advocate of third-party reporting may have a personal Facebook
account that allows incidental contact with an applicant.
Googling an applicant is unlikely to disappear. Ultimately, it is
up to the applicant to make sure that all sensitive material is
protected. And of course, states may impose tighter restrictions
on social media reporting than those supplied by the FCRA.
But in combination with third-party reporting, the FCRA works
where other regulations have not, it already exists and it balances the competing interest involved in social media preemployment screening. Why reinvent the wheel?
CONCLUSION
The emergence of social media provides employers an opportunity to research applicants online. Due to low privacy settings and easy accessibility, employers routinely view applicants’ social media pages during the hiring process. This upsets
188. See id.
189. See Sherman, supra note 95.
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many job applicants. Even though such material is somewhat
public, social media users are uncomfortable with the idea that
online content that is possibly false, misleading, or irrelevant
will play a role during hiring decisions. Previous efforts to control social media pre-employment screening and protect applicant privacy focused on Title VII, the ADA and the Fourth
Amendment. However, these efforts were largely unsatisfactory. So long as employers did not violate a specific law, they had
significant leeway to conduct social media research.
Beginning in 2010, third parties started offering to screen
applicants online for interested employers. Third-party social
media pre-employment screens are subject to the fairness constraints of the FCRA, and therefore they are a better solution
to the privacy interests implicated by social media research.
The FCRA requires applicant permission before a preemployment screen may begin, gives an applicant notice of adverse decisions based on social media, and allows applicants to
take remedial measures if their social media content is getting
in the way of job opportunities. FCRA compliant third-party
screens also ensure that employers receive only job-related information, adding efficiency to the hiring process. Consequently, the FCRA should be amended to require all employers interested in using social media to evaluate job applicants to use
third-party screening companies. The FTC and the EEOC
should be the primary parties responsible for enforcing employers’ commitment to third-party social media pre-employment
screening.

